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Recommendation for  
Block Cipher Modes of Operation:  
The RMAC Authentication Mode

*Methods and Techniques*

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Abstract

This Recommendation defines an authentication mode of operation, called RMAC, for a symmetric key block cipher algorithm. RMAC can provide cryptographic protection of sensitive, but unclassified, computer data. In particular, RMAC can provide assurance of the authenticity and, therefore, of the integrity of the data.

**KEY WORDS:** Authentication; block cipher; cryptography; encryption; Federal Information Processing Standard; information security; integrity; mode of operation.

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## 1 Purpose

This publication is the second part in a series of Recommendations regarding modes of operation of symmetric key block cipher algorithms.

## 2 Authority

This document has been developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in furtherance of its statutory responsibilities under the Computer Security Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-235) and the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, specifically 15 U.S.C. 278 g-3(a)(5). This is not a guideline within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. 278 g-3 (a)(5).

This Recommendation is neither a standard nor a guideline, and as such, is neither mandatory nor binding on federal agencies. Federal agencies and nongovernment organizations may use this Recommendation on a voluntary basis. It is not subject to copyright.

Nothing in this Recommendation should be taken to contradict standards and guidelines that have been made mandatory and binding upon federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority. Nor should this Recommendation be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, or any other federal official.

Conformance testing for implementations of the modes of operation that are specified in this Recommendation will be conducted within the framework of the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), a joint effort of NIST and the Communications Security Establishment of the Government of Canada. An implementation of a mode of operation must adhere to the requirements in this Recommendation in order to be validated under the CMVP. The requirements of this Recommendation are indicated by the word “shall.”

## 3 Introduction

This Recommendation specifies an algorithm, RMAC [1], that can provide assurance of data origin authentication and, hence, assurance of data integrity. In particular, RMAC is an algorithm for generating a message authentication code (MAC) from the data to be authenticated and from an associated value called the salt, using a block cipher and two secret keys that the parties to the authentication of the data establish beforehand. One party generates the MAC and provides the MAC and the associated salt as the authentication tag; subsequently, any party with access to the secret keys may verify whether the received MAC was generated from the received data and the received salt. Successful verification of the MAC provides assurance of the authenticity of the data, i.e., that it originated from a source with access to the secret keys. Consequently, successful verification of the MAC also provides assurance of the integrity of the data, i.e., that it was not altered after the generation of the MAC.

A MAC is sometimes called a cryptographic checksum, because it is generated from a keyed cryptographic algorithm in order to provide stronger assurance of data integrity than an ordinary checksum. The verification of an ordinary checksum or an error detecting code is designed to reveal only accidental modifications of the data, while the verification of a MAC is designed to reveal intentional, unauthorized modifications of the data, as well as accidental modifications.

Because RMAC is constructed from a block cipher algorithm, RMAC can be considered a mode of operation of the block cipher algorithm. The block cipher algorithm shall be approved, i.e., specified or adopted in a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) or a NIST Recommendation; for example, FIPS Pub. 197 [2] specifies the AES algorithm, and FIPS Pub. 46-3 [3] adopts the Triple DES algorithm.

FIPS Pub. 198 [4] specifies a different MAC algorithm, called HMAC, that is also appropriate for the protection of sensitive data. Because HMAC is constructed from a hash function rather than a block cipher algorithm, RMAC may be preferable for application environments in which an approved block cipher is more convenient to implement than an approved hash function.

## 4 Definitions, Abbreviations, and Symbols

### 4.1 Definitions and Abbreviations

|                          |   |
|--------------------------|---|
| Approved                 | FIPS approved or NIST recommended: an algorithm or technique that is either 1) specified in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation, or 2) adopted in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation.  |
| Authenticity             | The property that data indeed originated from its purported source.   |
| Authentication Mode      | A block cipher mode of operation that can provide assurance of the authenticity and, therefore, the integrity of data.  |
| Authentication Tag (Tag) | A pair of bit strings associated to data to provide assurance of its authenticity: the salt and the message authentication code that is derived from the data and the salt. |
| Bit                      | A binary digit: 0 or 1.   |
| Bit String               | An ordered sequence of 0s and 1s.   |
| Block                    | A bit string whose bit length is the block size of the block cipher algorithm.  |
| Block Cipher             | See forward cipher function.  |

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|                                   |  |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| Block Cipher Algorithm            | A family of functions and their inverses that is parameterized by cryptographic keys; the functions map bit strings of a fixed length to bit strings of the same length. |
| Block Size                        | The number of bits in an input (or output) block of the block cipher.  |
| Cryptographic Key                 | A parameter used in the block cipher algorithm that determines the forward cipher function.  |
| Data Integrity                    | The property that data has not been altered by an unauthorized entity.   |
| Exclusive-OR                      | The bitwise addition, modulo 2, of two bit strings of equal length.  |
| FIPS                              | Federal Information Processing Standard.   |
| Forward Cipher Function           | One of the two functions of the block cipher algorithm that is determined by the choice of a cryptographic key.  |
| Initialization Vector (IV)        | A data block that some modes of operation require as an initial input.   |
| Message Authentication Code (MAC) | A cryptographic checksum on data that is designed to reveal both accidental errors and intentional modifications of the data.  |
| Mode of Operation (Mode)          | An algorithm for the cryptographic transformation of data that features a symmetric key block cipher algorithm.  |
| Most Significant Bit(s)           | The left-most bit(s) of a bit string.  |
| Nonce                             | A value that is used only once within a specified context.   |
| RMAC                              | The name of the authentication mode that is specified in this Recommendation.  |
| Salt                              | A parameter of an algorithm whose role is to randomize the value of another parameter.   |

## 4.2 Symbols

### 4.2.1 Variables

*b*                    The block size, in bits.

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|          |   |
|----------|---|
| $k$      | The key length for the block cipher.                              |
| $m$      | The bit length of the RMAC MAC.                                   |
| $n$      | The number of data blocks in the padded message.                  |
| $r$      | The bit length of the salt.                                       |
| $CNST_j$ | The $j$ th fixed, i.e., constant, block.                          |
| $K$      | A block cipher key.   |
| $K1$     | The first RMAC key.   |
| $K2$     | The second RMAC key.  |
| $K3$     | A key that is derived from the second RMAC key and the salt.      |
| $M$      | The message.  |
| $Mlen$   | The bit length of the message.                                    |
| $M_j$    | The $j^{\text{th}}$ block in the partition of the padded message. |
| $O_j$    | The $j^{\text{th}}$ output block.                                 |
| $PAD$    | The padding that is appended to the message.                      |
| $R$      | The salt.   |

### 4.2.2 Operations and Functions

|                 |   |
|-----------------|---|
| $0^s$           | The bit string consisting of $s$ '0' bits.  |
| $X \parallel Y$ | The concatenation of two bit strings $X$ and $Y$ .  |
| $X \oplus Y$    | The bitwise exclusive-OR of two bit strings $X$ and $Y$ of the same length.                                 |
| $CIPH_K(X)$     | The forward cipher function of the block cipher algorithm under the key $K$ applied to the data block $X$ . |
| $MSB_s(X)$      | The bit string consisting of the $s$ most significant bits of the bit string $X$ .                          |
| $RMAC(R,M)$     | The RMAC message authentication code for message $M$ with salt $R$ .  |



## 5 Preliminaries

### 5.1 *The Underlying Block Cipher Algorithm*

The RMAC algorithm specified in this Recommendation depends on the choice of an underlying symmetric key block cipher algorithm; the RMAC algorithm is thus a mode of operation (mode, for short) of the symmetric key block cipher. The underlying block cipher algorithm must be approved, and two secret, random keys for the block cipher algorithm shall be established. The keys regulate the functioning of the block cipher algorithm and, thus, by extension, the functioning of the mode. The specifications of the block cipher algorithm and the mode are public, so the security of the mode depends, at a minimum, on the secrecy of the keys.

For any given key, the underlying block cipher algorithm of the mode consists of two processes that are inverses of each other. As part of the choice of the block cipher algorithm, one of the two processes of the block cipher algorithm is designated as the forward cipher function. The inverse of this process is called the inverse cipher function. Because the RMAC mode does not require the inverse cipher function, the forward cipher function in this Part of the Recommendation is simply called the block cipher.

### 5.2 *Elements of RMAC*

The block cipher keys that are required for the RMAC mode are bit strings, denoted  $K1$  and  $K2$ , whose bit length, denoted  $k$ , depends on the choice of the block cipher algorithm. The keys shall be random or pseudorandom, distinct from keys that are used for other purposes, and secret. The two keys shall each be established by an approved key establishment method, or the keys shall be derived from a single key  $K$ , which is established by an approved key establishment method. A method for deriving  $K1$  and  $K2$  from a single, master key  $K$  is given in Appendix B.1.

The block cipher is a function on bit strings of a fixed bit length. The fixed bit length of the bit strings is called the block size and is denoted  $b$ ; any bit string whose bit length is  $b$  is called a (data) block. Under a key  $K$ , the block cipher function is denoted  $CIPH_K$ .

For the AES algorithm,  $b=128$  and  $k=128, 192, \text{ or } 256$ ; for Triple DES,  $b=64$  and  $k=112$  or  $168$ .

The data to be authenticated is one input to the RMAC MAC generation function; the data in this context is called the message, denoted  $M$ .

Another input to the MAC generation function is a parameter associated with the message called the salt, denoted  $R$ . The role of the salt in the MAC generation function is to randomize (i.e., “flavor”) the second key,  $K2$ . The bit length of the salt, denoted  $r$ , is determined by the choice of a parameter set that is specified in Section 6.2. The use of the salt is optional in the sense that a parameter set may be chosen in which  $r=0$ . When  $r \neq 0$ , the method for generating the salt shall ensure that the expected probability of repeating the salt for different messages is negligible. The generation of the salt is discussed further in Appendix B.2.

The RMAC MAC generation function is denoted  $RMAC$ , so that the output of the function, the MAC, is denoted  $RMAC(R,M)$ . The bit length of the MAC, denoted  $m$ , is determined by the

choice of a parameter set that is specified in Section 6.2. The authentication tag to the message is the ordered pair  $(R, RMAC(R,M))$ ; thus, the tag consists of one part, the salt, that may be independent of the message and a second part, the MAC, that depends on both the salt and the message. The total number of bits in the tag is  $r+m$ .

### 5.3 Examples of Operations and Functions

For a nonnegative integer  $s$ , the bit string consisting of  $s$  ‘0’ bits is denoted  $0^s$ .

The concatenation operation on bit strings is denoted  $\parallel$ ; for example,  $001 \parallel 10111 = 00110111$ .

Given bit strings of equal length, the exclusive-OR operation, denoted  $\oplus$ , specifies the addition, modulo 2, of the bits in each bit position, i.e., without carries. Thus,  $10011 \oplus 10101 = 00110$ , for example.

The function  $MSB_s$  returns the  $s$  most significant bits of the argument. Thus, for example,  $MSB_4(111011010) = 1110$ .

## 6 RMAC Specification

### 6.1 Message Formatting

The first steps of the MAC generation function are to append padding to the message and to partition the resulting string into complete blocks. The padding, denoted  $PAD$ , is a single ‘1’ bit followed by the minimum number of ‘0’ bits such that the total number of bits in the padded message is a multiple of the block size. The padded message is then partitioned into a sequence of  $n$  complete blocks, denoted  $M_1, M_2, \dots, M_n$ . Thus,

$$M \parallel PAD = M_1 \parallel M_2 \parallel \dots \parallel M_n .$$

If the bit length of  $M$  is a multiple of the block size, then  $PAD = 1 \parallel 0^{b-1}$ , i.e., a complete block.

### 6.2 Parameter Sets

A parameter set is a pair of values for the bit lengths  $r$  and  $m$  of the two parts of the authentication tag, the salt and the MAC. The parameter sets for RMAC depend on the block size of the underlying block cipher algorithm. A parameter set shall be chosen from Table 1 below; five parameter sets are given for the 128 bit block size, and two for the 64 bit block size.

Although parameter set I offers the shortest authentication tags, it is not recommended for general use. The decision to use parameter set I requires a risk-benefit analysis of at least three factors: 1) the relevant attack models, 2) the application environment, and 3) the value and longevity of the data to be protected. In particular, parameter set I shall only be used if the controlling protocol or application environment sufficiently restricts the number of times that verification of an authentication tag can fail under any given pair of RMAC keys. For example,

the short duration of a session, or, more generally, the low bandwidth of the communication channel may preclude many repeated trials.

Parameter sets II, III, IV, and V are appropriate for general use.

Table 1: Parameter Sets

| Parameter Set | $b=128$ |     | $b=64$ |     |
|---------------|---------|-----|--------|-----|
|               | $r$     | $m$ | $r$    | $m$ |
| I             | 0       | 32  | 0      | 32  |
| II            | 0       | 64  | 64     | 64  |
| III           | 16      | 80  | n/a    |     |
| IV            | 64      | 96  | n/a    |     |
| V             | 128     | 128 | n/a    |     |

Some of the security considerations that underlie the selection of a parameter set are summarized in Appendix A. The expected work factors for important aspects of the attacks that are discussed in the appendix are summarized for each parameter set in Table 2 in Section A.4.

### 6.3 MAC Generation

The following is a specification of the RMAC MAC generation function:

*Input:*

block cipher  $CIPH$ ;  
 block cipher keys  $K1$  and  $K2$  of bit length  $k$ ;  
 parameter set  $(r, m)$ ;  
 message  $M$ ;  
 salt  $R$  of bit length  $r$ .

*Output:*

message authentication code  $RMAC(R, M)$  of bit length  $m$ .

*Steps:*

1. Append to  $M$  the padding string  $PAD$ , as described in Section 6.1.
2. Partition  $M \parallel PAD$  into  $n$  blocks  $M_1, M_2, \dots, M_n$ , as described in Section 6.1.
3.  $O_1 = CIPH_{K1}(M_1)$ .
4. For  $j = 2$  to  $n$ , do  $O_j = CIPH_{K1}(M_j \oplus O_{j-1})$ .
5. If  $r=0$ , then  $K3=K2$ ; else  $K3 = K2 \oplus (R \parallel 0^{k-r})$ .
6. Return  $RMAC(R, M) = MSB_m(CIPH_{K3}(O_n))$ .

The calculations in Steps 3 and 4 are equivalent to encrypting the padded message using the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode [5] of the block cipher, under the first RMAC key, with the zero block as the initialization vector. However, unlike CBC encryption, in which every output block from Steps 3 and 4 is part of the encryption output (i.e., the ciphertext), in RMAC, the output blocks in Steps 3 and 4 are intermediate results. In Step 6, the block cipher under a new

key is applied to the final output block from Step 4, and the result is truncated as specified in the parameter set. The new key for this final application of the block cipher is obtained in Step 5 by exclusive-ORing the salt into the most significant bits of the second RMAC key.

The RMAC MAC generation function is illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1: The RMAC MAC Generation Function

#### 6.4 Tag Generation and Verification

The prerequisites for the authentication process are the establishment of an approved block cipher algorithm, two secret RMAC keys, and a parameter set<sup>1</sup> among the parties to the authentication of the data.

To generate an authentication tag on a message  $M$ , a party shall determine an associated salt  $R$  in accordance with Appendix B, generate  $RMAC(R, M)$ , as specified in Section 6.3, and provide the authentication tag  $(R, RMAC(R, M))$  to the data.

To verify an authentication tag  $(R', MAC')$ , a party shall apply the RMAC MAC generation function, as specified in Section 6.3, to the received message  $M'$  and the received salt  $R'$  within the tag. If the computed MAC, i.e.,  $RMAC(R', M')$ , is identical to the received MAC, i.e.,  $MAC'$ , then verification succeeds; otherwise, verification fails, and the message should not be considered authentic.

<sup>1</sup> For tag verification, the parameter set is implicit in the bit length of the tag.

## **Appendix A: Security Considerations**

The submitters of RMAC present a security analysis of RMAC in [6]. In this appendix, three types of attacks on general MAC algorithms are summarized, and discussed with respect to RMAC: exhaustive key search, general forgery, and extension forgery based on birthday collisions.

### ***A.1 Exhaustive Key Search***

In principle, given sufficiently many valid message-tag pairs, an unauthorized party can exhaustively search, off-line, every possible key to the MAC generation algorithm. After recovering the secret key, by this method or any other method, the unauthorized party could generate a forgery, i.e., a valid authentication tag, for any message.

The number of RMAC keys is so large that exhaustive key search of RMAC is impractical for the foreseeable future. In particular, for the key size  $k$ , which is at least 112 bits for the approved block cipher algorithms, the exhaustive search for the two RMAC keys would be expected to require the generation of  $2^{2k-1}$  MACs. Even if the two RMAC keys are derived from a single master key, as discussed in Appendix B.1, the exhaustive search for the master key would be expected to require the generation of  $2^{k-1}$  MACs.

### ***A.2 General Forgery***

The successful verification of a MAC does not guarantee that the associated message is authentic: there is a small chance that an unauthorized party can guess a valid MAC of an arbitrary (i.e., inauthentic) message. Moreover, if many message forgeries are presented for verification, the probability increases that, eventually, verification will succeed for one of them. This limitation is inherent in any MAC algorithm.

The protection that the RMAC algorithm provides against such forgeries is determined by the bit length of MAC,  $m$ , which in turn is determined by the choice of a parameter set. The probability of successful verification of an arbitrary MAC with any given salt on any given message is expected to be  $2^{-m}$ ; therefore, larger values of  $m$  offer greater protection against general forgery.

### ***A.3 Extension Forgery Based on a Collision***

The underlying idea of extension forgery attacks is for the unauthorized party to find a collision, i.e., two different messages with the same MAC (before any truncation). If the colliding messages are each concatenated with a common string, then, for many MAC algorithms, including RMAC, the two extended messages have a common MAC. Therefore, the knowledge of the MAC of one extended message facilitates the forgery of the other extended message. The unauthorized party can choose the second part of the forged message, i.e., the common string, but generally cannot control the first part, i.e., either of the original, colliding messages.

In principle, collisions may exist, because there are many more possible messages than possible MACs. A collision may be detected by the collection and search of a sufficiently large set of message-MAC pairs. By the so-called “birthday surprise” (see, for example, [7]), the size of this sufficiently large set is expected to be, approximately, the square root of the number of possible MAC strings, before any truncation.

For RMAC, the extension forgery requires that the salt values,  $R$ , are the same for the two colliding messages, as well as the untruncated MACs, i.e.,  $CIPH_{K3}(O_n)$  in the specification of Section 6.3. Therefore, larger values of the block size,  $b$ , and the salt size,  $r$ , provide greater protection against extension forgery. In particular, the unauthorized party would have to collect at least  $2^{(b+r)/2}$  message-tag pairs in order to expect to detect a collision.

Moreover, if a parameter set is chosen in which  $m < b$ , i.e., if  $CIPH_{K3}(O_n)$  is truncated to produce the MAC, then the discarded bits may be difficult for an unauthorized party to determine, so collisions may be difficult to detect. Parameter sets in which  $m < b$  may also provide some protection against other types of attacks.

#### A.4 Summary of Security Properties of Parameter Sets

In Table 2, the expected work factors for the important aspects of the attacks discussed in Sections A.1-A.3 are summarized for the RMAC parameter sets. The values for exhaustive key search are given for the case in which the two RMAC keys are generated from a single master key as discussed in Section B.1.

Table 2: Expected Work Factors for Three Types of Attacks on RMAC

| RMAC Parameter Set | Exhaustive Key Search (MAC Generation Operations) | General Forgery (Success Probability for a Single Trial ) | Extension Forgery (Message-Tag Pairs)       |
|--------------------|---|---|---|
| I                  | $2^{k-1}$   | $2^{-32}$   | $2^{32}$ ( $b=64$ ) or $2^{64}$ ( $b=128$ ) |
| II                 | $2^{k-1}$   | $2^{-64}$   | $2^{64}$                                    |
| III                | $2^{k-1}$   | $2^{-80}$   | $2^{72}$                                    |
| IV                 | $2^{k-1}$   | $2^{-96}$   | $2^{96}$                                    |
| V                  | $2^{k-1}$   | $2^{-128}$  | $2^{128}$                                   |

## Appendix B: The Generation of RMAC Parameters

### B.1 Derivation of RMAC keys from a Master Key

The two secret RMAC keys,  $K1$  and  $K2$ , may be derived from a single master key,  $K$ , in order to save bandwidth or storage, at the cost of extra invocations of the block cipher to set up the RMAC keys. For example, let  $CNST_1$ ,  $CNST_2$ ,  $CNST_3$ ,  $CNST_4$ ,  $CNST_5$ , and  $CNST_6$  be constants, i.e., fixed, distinct blocks, and let  $k$  and  $b$  be the key length and block length of the approved block cipher, as before. If  $k \leq 3b$ , then  $K1$  and  $K2$  may be derived from the set of constants as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} K1 &= MSB_k(CIPH_K(CNST_1) \parallel CIPH_K(CNST_3) \parallel CIPH_K(CNST_5)) \\ K2 &= MSB_k(CIPH_K(CNST_2) \parallel CIPH_K(CNST_4) \parallel CIPH_K(CNST_6)). \end{aligned}$$

If  $k=b$ , then this definition reduces to  $K1=CIPH_K(CNST_1)$  and  $K2=CIPH_K(CNST_2)$ , and thus only two constants are actually required.

Similarly, if  $b < k \leq 2b$ , then the definition becomes  $K1=MSB_k(CIPH_K(CNST_1) \parallel CIPH_K(CNST_3))$  and  $K2=MSB_k(CIPH_K(CNST_2) \parallel CIPH_K(CNST_4))$ , and thus only four constants are required.

### B.2 Salt Generation

The salt values associated with messages shall repeat with no more than negligible probability. In particular, the expected probability that the same salt will be associated with two different messages that are authenticated under the scope of any pair of RMAC keys shall be no greater than for random values of salt. Therefore, one approach to meeting the requirement is to generate the salt by an approved deterministic random number generator.

Another approach is to ensure that the probability of associating the same salt to different messages is zero, in other words, to generate a nonce to be the salt. For example, the salt may be a counter or a message number.

## Appendix C: Example Vectors for the MAC Generation Function

In this appendix, examples vectors are provided for the RMAC MAC generation function with either the AES algorithm or Triple DES as the underlying block cipher. For each allowed key size of the underlying block cipher, MACs are generated on three messages for each parameter set. The lengths of the three messages, denoted  $Mlen$ , are 128 bits, 384 bits, and 400 bits. In addition to the MAC for the given input values, intermediate results are provided. All strings are represented in hexadecimal notation.

### C.1 RMAC-AES128 Example Vectors

#### C.1.1 RMAC-AES128-I

##### RMAC-AES128, $r=0$ , $m=32$ , $Mlen=128$

$M$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 $K1$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 $K2$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 $R$ : none

$M || PAD$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 80000000000000000000000000000000  
 $O_1$ : 0a940bb5416ef045f1c39458c653ea5a  
 $O_n$ : 3a3807ffe3cb3e978953017210335f0f  
 $K3$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 $CIPH_{K3}(O_n)$ : bfc3c92e04100777be98f7a93e178381  
 $RMAC(R, M)$ : bfc3c92e

##### RMAC-AES128, $r=0$ , $m=32$ , $Mlen=384$

$M$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
 202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
 $K1$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 $K2$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 $R$ : none

$M || PAD$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
 202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
 80000000000000000000000000000000  
 $O_1$ : 0a940bb5416ef045f1c39458c653ea5a  
 $O_2$ : 3cf456b4ca488aa383c79c98b34797cb  
 $O_3$ : 7e163e30ea49d32152a51a08a10ec02d  
 $O_n$ : c5b089e3e4710856581f28b42824c651  
 $K3$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 $CIPH_{K3}(O_n)$ : a3c33ae5f5d19094c5f65faa4ee60696  
 $RMAC(R, M)$ : a3c33ae5

##### RMAC-AES128, $r=0$ , $m=32$ , $Mlen=400$

$M$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f



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101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
3031  
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
R: none

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
303180000000000000000000000000000000  
O\_1: 0a940bb5416ef045f1c39458c653ea5a  
O\_2: 3cf456b4ca488aa383c79c98b34797cb  
O\_3: 7e163e30ea49d32152a51a08a10ec02d  
O\_n: 6a83b72738a946e319702dfd323fae52  
K3: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
CIPH\_K3(O\_n): 4577d30eac2b9a438e507ecf22cc5fbd  
RMAC(R,M): 4577d30e

C.1.2 RMAC-AES128-II

RMAC-AES128, r=0, m=64, Mlen=128

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
R: none

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
800000000000000000000000000000000000  
O\_1: 0a940bb5416ef045f1c39458c653ea5a  
O\_n: 3a3807ffe3cb3e978953017210335f0f  
K3: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
CIPH\_K3(O\_n): bfc3c92e04100777be98f7a93e178381  
RMAC(R,M): bfc3c92e04100777

RMAC-AES128, r=0, m=64, Mlen=384

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
R: none

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
800000000000000000000000000000000000  
O\_1: 0a940bb5416ef045f1c39458c653ea5a  
O\_2: 3cf456b4ca488aa383c79c98b34797cb  
O\_3: 7e163e30ea49d32152a51a08a10ec02d  
O\_n: c5b089e3e4710856581f28b42824c651  
K3: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
CIPH\_K3(O\_n): a3c33ae5f5d19094c5f65faa4ee60696

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$RMAC(R, M)$  : a3c33ae5f5d19094

$RMAC-AES128, r=0, m=64, Mlen=400$

$M$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
3031  
 $K1$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 $K2$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 $R$ : none  
 $M || PAD$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
303180000000000000000000000000000000  
 $O_1$ : 0a940bb5416ef045f1c39458c653ea5a  
 $O_2$ : 3cf456b4ca488aa383c79c98b34797cb  
 $O_3$ : 7e163e30ea49d32152a51a08a10ec02d  
 $O_n$ : 6a83b72738a946e319702dfd323fae52  
 $K3$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 $CIPH_{K3}(O_n)$ : 4577d30eac2b9a438e507ecf22cc5fbd  
 $RMAC(R, M)$ : 4577d30eac2b9a43

C.1.3  $RMAC-AES128-III$

$RMAC-AES128, r=16, m=80, Mlen=128$

$M$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 $K1$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 $K2$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 $R$ : 0002  
 $M || PAD$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
800000000000000000000000000000000000  
 $O_1$ : 0a940bb5416ef045f1c39458c653ea5a  
 $O_n$ : 3a3807ffe3cb3e978953017210335f0f  
 $K3$ : 0f0c0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 $CIPH_{K3}(O_n)$ : 20c83a745eaecfe41f9b3473a1b0edd8  
 $RMAC(R, M)$ : 20c83a745eaecfe41f9b

$RMAC-AES128, r=16, m=80, Mlen=384$

$M$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
 $K1$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 $K2$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 $R$ : 0002  
 $M || PAD$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
800000000000000000000000000000000000  
 $O_1$ : 0a940bb5416ef045f1c39458c653ea5a  
 $O_2$ : 3cf456b4ca488aa383c79c98b34797cb



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```

202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f
80000000000000000000000000000000
O_1: 0a940bb5416ef045f1c39458c653ea5a
O_2: 3cf456b4ca488aa383c79c98b34797cb
O_3: 7e163e30ea49d32152a51a08a10ec02d
O_n: c5b089e3e4710856581f28b42824c651
K3: 0f0c090a030005060706050403020100
CIPH_K3(O_n): 9749f97b3b10a9100bdaaf0677364594
RMAC(R,M): 9749f97b3b10a9100bdaaf06

```

RMAC-AES128, r=64, m=96, Mlen=400

```

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f
3031
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100
R: 00020406080a0c0e

```

```

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f
3031800000000000000000000000000000
O_1: 0a940bb5416ef045f1c39458c653ea5a
O_2: 3cf456b4ca488aa383c79c98b34797cb
O_3: 7e163e30ea49d32152a51a08a10ec02d
O_n: 6a83b72738a946e319702dfd323fae52
K3: 0f0c090a030005060706050403020100
CIPH_K3(O_n): c113dee9836e83a3da88e96f3b9ab98c
RMAC(R,M): c113dee9836e83a3da88e96f

```

C.1.5 RMAC-AES128-V

RMAC-AES128, r=128, m=128, Mlen=128

```

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100
R: 00020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e

```

```

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
8000000000000000000000000000000000
O_1: 0a940bb5416ef045f1c39458c653ea5a
O_n: 3a3807ffe3cb3e978953017210335f0f
K3: 0f0c090a03000506171411121b181d1e
CIPH_K3(O_n): af943d43bd96a50ac7f15805f8a54c3b
RMAC(R,M): af943d43bd96a50ac7f15805f8a54c3b

```

RMAC-AES128, r=128, m=128, Mlen=384

```

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100

```

## DRAFT

R: 00020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
80000000000000000000000000000000

O<sub>1</sub>: 0a940bb5416ef045f1c39458c653ea5a  
O<sub>2</sub>: 3cf456b4ca488aa383c79c98b34797cb  
O<sub>3</sub>: 7e163e30ea49d32152a51a08a10ec02d  
O<sub>n</sub>: c5b089e3e4710856581f28b42824c651  
K<sub>3</sub>: 0f0c090a03000506171411121b181d1e  
CIPH<sub>K<sub>3</sub></sub>(O<sub>n</sub>): 0c4112b241a6cd0b2c035c32b0a3069d  
RMAC<sub>(R,M)</sub>: 0c4112b241a6cd0b2c035c32b0a3069d

### RMAC-AES128, r=128, m=128, Mlen=400

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
3031

K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
R: 00020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
3031800000000000000000000000000000

O<sub>1</sub>: 0a940bb5416ef045f1c39458c653ea5a  
O<sub>2</sub>: 3cf456b4ca488aa383c79c98b34797cb  
O<sub>3</sub>: 7e163e30ea49d32152a51a08a10ec02d  
O<sub>n</sub>: 6a83b72738a946e319702dfd323fae52  
K<sub>3</sub>: 0f0c090a03000506171411121b181d1e  
CIPH<sub>K<sub>3</sub></sub>(O<sub>n</sub>): 134ed2b75f5181d55b28b5c89fcddfa9  
RMAC<sub>(R,M)</sub>: 134ed2b75f5181d55b28b5c89fcddfa9

## C.2 RMAC-AES192 Example Vectors

### C.2.1 RMAC-AES192-I

#### RMAC-AES192, r=0, m=32, Mlen=128

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffedfdcfbfaf9f8  
R: none

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
8000000000000000000000000000000000

O<sub>1</sub>: 0060bffe46834bb8da5cf9a61ff220ae  
O<sub>n</sub>: 7ca81022abf4cacef6b163fcc293d97b  
K<sub>3</sub>: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffedfdcfbfaf9f8  
CIPH<sub>K<sub>3</sub></sub>(O<sub>n</sub>): 39b706e7b325ed996378a3c50d21f7d2  
RMAC<sub>(R,M)</sub>: 39b706e7

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RMAC-AES192, r=0, m=32, Mlen=384

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffedfdcfbfaf9f8  
R: none

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
80000000000000000000000000000000  
O<sub>1</sub>: 0060bffe46834bb8da5cf9a61ff220ae  
O<sub>2</sub>: b9770009a06cb2d7f6f296be878bb327  
O<sub>3</sub>: 768c7a588c69a095769d7625ba2a6156  
O<sub>n</sub>: b7f7c982ea9adf76d7b39f573bf27ce3  
K<sub>3</sub>: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffedfdcfbfaf9f8  
CIPH K<sub>3</sub> (O<sub>n</sub>): 728b9fce7387812bc886705aa22b34fc  
RMAC(R, M): 728b9fce

RMAC-AES192, r=0, m=32, Mlen=400

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
3031  
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffedfdcfbfaf9f8  
R: none

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
30318000000000000000000000000000  
O<sub>1</sub>: 0060bffe46834bb8da5cf9a61ff220ae  
O<sub>2</sub>: b9770009a06cb2d7f6f296be878bb327  
O<sub>3</sub>: 768c7a588c69a095769d7625ba2a6156  
O<sub>n</sub>: 55cecf599e6223b05f9e668a85940675  
K<sub>3</sub>: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffedfdcfbfaf9f8  
CIPH K<sub>3</sub> (O<sub>n</sub>): 69f4dca84d548fd45995a9cbe51f516b  
RMAC(R, M): 69f4dca8

C.2.2 RMAC-AES192-II

RMAC-AES192, r=0, m=64, Mlen=128

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffedfdcfbfaf9f8  
R: none

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
80000000000000000000000000000000  
O<sub>1</sub>: 0060bffe46834bb8da5cf9a61ff220ae  
O<sub>n</sub>: 7ca81022abf4cacef6b163fcc293d97b

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$K_3$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffedfcfbfaf9f8  
 $CIPH_{K_3}(O_n)$ : 39b706e7b325ed996378a3c50d21f7d2  
 $RMAC(R, M)$ : 39b706e7b325ed99

RMAC-AES192, r=0, m=64, Mlen=384

$M$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
 $K_1$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617  
 $K_2$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffedfcfbfaf9f8  
 $R$ : none

$M || PAD$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
80000000000000000000000000000000  
 $O_1$ : 0060bffe46834bb8da5cf9a61ff220ae  
 $O_2$ : b9770009a06cb2d7f6f296be878bb327  
 $O_3$ : 768c7a588c69a095769d7625ba2a6156  
 $O_n$ : b7f7c982ea9adf76d7b39f573bf27ce3  
 $K_3$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffedfcfbfaf9f8  
 $CIPH_{K_3}(O_n)$ : 728b9fce7387812bc886705aa22b34fc  
 $RMAC(R, M)$ : 728b9fce7387812b

RMAC-AES192, r=0, m=64, Mlen=400

$M$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
3031  
 $K_1$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617  
 $K_2$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffedfcfbfaf9f8  
 $R$ : none

$M || PAD$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
30318000000000000000000000000000  
 $O_1$ : 0060bffe46834bb8da5cf9a61ff220ae  
 $O_2$ : b9770009a06cb2d7f6f296be878bb327  
 $O_3$ : 768c7a588c69a095769d7625ba2a6156  
 $O_n$ : 55cecf599e6223b05f9e668a85940675  
 $K_3$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffedfcfbfaf9f8  
 $CIPH_{K_3}(O_n)$ : 69f4dca84d548fd45995a9cbe51f516b  
 $RMAC(R, M)$ : 69f4dca84d548fd4

**C.2.3 RMAC-AES192-III**

RMAC-AES192, r=16, m=80, Mlen=128

$M$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 $K_1$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617  
 $K_2$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffedfcfbfaf9f8  
 $R$ : 0002

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$M || PAD$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
80000000000000000000000000000000  
 $O_1$ : 0060bffe46834bb8da5cf9a61ff220ae  
 $O_n$ : 7ca81022abf4cacef6b163fcc293d97b  
 $K_3$ : 0f0c0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffefdfcfbfaf9f8  
 $CIPH_{K_3}(O_n)$ : 3b52b2ddf6cf84a345dbfaac33e70c14  
 $RMAC(R, M)$ : 3b52b2ddf6cf84a345db

RMAC-AES192, r=16, m=80, Mlen=384

$M$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
 $K_1$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617  
 $K_2$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffefdfcfbfaf9f8  
 $R$ : 0002

$M || PAD$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
80000000000000000000000000000000  
 $O_1$ : 0060bffe46834bb8da5cf9a61ff220ae  
 $O_2$ : b9770009a06cb2d7f6f296be878bb327  
 $O_3$ : 768c7a588c69a095769d7625ba2a6156  
 $O_n$ : b7f7c982ea9adf76d7b39f573bf27ce3  
 $K_3$ : 0f0c0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffefdfcfbfaf9f8  
 $CIPH_{K_3}(O_n)$ : 70e045cc49f28b0d88ebeaa10879d6b3  
 $RMAC(R, M)$ : 70e045cc49f28b0d88eb

RMAC-AES192, r=16, m=80, Mlen=400

$M$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
3031  
 $K_1$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617  
 $K_2$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffefdfcfbfaf9f8  
 $R$ : 0002

$M || PAD$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
30318000000000000000000000000000  
 $O_1$ : 0060bffe46834bb8da5cf9a61ff220ae  
 $O_2$ : b9770009a06cb2d7f6f296be878bb327  
 $O_3$ : 768c7a588c69a095769d7625ba2a6156  
 $O_n$ : 55cecf599e6223b05f9e668a85940675  
 $K_3$ : 0f0c0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffefdfcfbfaf9f8  
 $CIPH_{K_3}(O_n)$ : fac08a8c935857a7259611ee936ae89f  
 $RMAC(R, M)$ : fac08a8c935857a72596

C.2.4 RMAC-AES192-IV

RMAC-AES192, r=64, m=96, Mlen=128

$M$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f



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K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffedfdcfbfaf9f8  
R: 00020406080a0c0e

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
80000000000000000000000000000000  
O<sub>1</sub>: 0060bffe46834bb8da5cf9a61ff220ae  
O<sub>n</sub>: 7ca81022abf4cacef6b163fcc293d97b  
K<sub>3</sub>: 0f0c090a030005060706050403020100ffffedfdcfbfaf9f8  
CIPH K<sub>3</sub> (O<sub>n</sub>): 59cc0de0d44380fbdbeda239bad043c9  
RMAC(R, M): 59cc0de0d44380fbdbeda239

RMAC-AES192, r=64, m=96, Mlen=384

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffedfdcfbfaf9f8  
R: 00020406080a0c0e

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
80000000000000000000000000000000  
O<sub>1</sub>: 0060bffe46834bb8da5cf9a61ff220ae  
O<sub>2</sub>: b9770009a06cb2d7f6f296be878bb327  
O<sub>3</sub>: 768c7a588c69a095769d7625ba2a6156  
O<sub>n</sub>: b7f7c982ea9adf76d7b39f573bf27ce3  
K<sub>3</sub>: 0f0c090a030005060706050403020100ffffedfdcfbfaf9f8  
CIPH K<sub>3</sub> (O<sub>n</sub>): 8dc19eae6ba69492da5ad7e8c3b02a9f  
RMAC(R, M): 8dc19eae6ba69492da5ad7e8

RMAC-AES192, r=64, m=96, Mlen=400

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
3031  
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffedfdcfbfaf9f8  
R: 00020406080a0c0e

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
30318000000000000000000000000000  
O<sub>1</sub>: 0060bffe46834bb8da5cf9a61ff220ae  
O<sub>2</sub>: b9770009a06cb2d7f6f296be878bb327  
O<sub>3</sub>: 768c7a588c69a095769d7625ba2a6156  
O<sub>n</sub>: 55cecf599e6223b05f9e668a85940675  
K<sub>3</sub>: 0f0c090a030005060706050403020100ffffedfdcfbfaf9f8  
CIPH K<sub>3</sub> (O<sub>n</sub>): 57c06430e96ca8d8418bae41550fb235  
RMAC(R, M): 57c06430e96ca8d8418bae41

## C.2.5 RMAC-AES192-V

RMAC-AES192, r=128, m=128, Mlen=128

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617  
 K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffdfcfbfaf9f8  
 R: 00020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 80000000000000000000000000000000  
 O\_1: 0060bffe46834bb8da5cf9a61ff220ae  
 O\_n: 7ca81022abf4cacef6b163fcc293d97b  
 K3: 0f0c090a03000506171411121b181d1effffdfcfbfaf9f8  
 CIPH\_K3(O\_n): 7f0707c15a76c585e1ab64becff8f72f  
 RMAC(R,M): 7f0707c15a76c585e1ab64becff8f72f

RMAC-AES192, r=128, m=128, Mlen=384

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
 202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
 K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617  
 K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffdfcfbfaf9f8  
 R: 00020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
 202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
 80000000000000000000000000000000  
 O\_1: 0060bffe46834bb8da5cf9a61ff220ae  
 O\_2: b9770009a06cb2d7f6f296be878bb327  
 O\_3: 768c7a588c69a095769d7625ba2a6156  
 O\_n: b7f7c982ea9adf76d7b39f573bf27ce3  
 K3: 0f0c090a03000506171411121b181d1effffdfcfbfaf9f8  
 CIPH\_K3(O\_n): 7e1d2e6b6f8e034d691da6933430e890  
 RMAC(R,M): 7e1d2e6b6f8e034d691da6933430e890

RMAC-AES192, r=128, m=128, Mlen=400

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
 202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
 3031  
 K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617  
 K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100ffffdfcfbfaf9f8  
 R: 00020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
 202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
 30318000000000000000000000000000  
 O\_1: 0060bffe46834bb8da5cf9a61ff220ae  
 O\_2: b9770009a06cb2d7f6f296be878bb327  
 O\_3: 768c7a588c69a095769d7625ba2a6156  
 O\_n: 55cecf599e6223b05f9e668a85940675

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*K3* : 0f0c090a03000506171411121b181d1efffefdfcfbfaf9f8  
*CIPH\_K3* (*O\_n*) : 90070049cbb7320aa280538d305750a4  
*RMAC*(*R,M*) : 90070049cbb7320aa280538d305750a4

**C.3 RMAC-AES256 Example Vectors**

**C.3.1 RMAC-AES256-I**

RMAC-AES256, r=0, m=32, Mlen=128

*M* : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
*K1* : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
*K2* : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
*R* : none  
  
*M* || *PAD* : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 80000000000000000000000000000000  
*O\_1* : 5a6e045708fb7196f02e553d02c3a692  
*O\_n* : 6c6b8e74018490dd71ecc1c8702ec1b9  
*K3* : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
*CIPH\_K3* (*O\_n*) : f0add4b561df479d39cc03e8cccbdf1b  
*RMAC*(*R,M*) : f0add4b5

RMAC-AES256, r=0, m=32, Mlen=384

*M* : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
 202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
*K1* : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
*K2* : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
*R* : none  
  
*M* || *PAD* : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
 202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
 80000000000000000000000000000000  
*O\_1* : 5a6e045708fb7196f02e553d02c3a692  
*O\_2* : c77147ebd5121de8d0fae7762423b6bf  
*O\_3* : 78e2e0038b691b8bedfc32116811da59  
*O\_n* : f97f3c703a595c4617629149ccc22404  
*K3* : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
*CIPH\_K3* (*O\_n*) : 285c32e810a3aa093f2ff2029cbb38e3  
*RMAC*(*R,M*) : 285c32e8

RMAC-AES256, r=0, m=32, Mlen=400

*M* : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
 202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f

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3031  
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
fffe<sub>f</sub>dfcfb<sub>f</sub>af9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
R: none  
M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
303180000000000000000000000000000000  
O<sub>1</sub>: 5a6e045708fb7196f02e553d02c3a692  
O<sub>2</sub>: c77147ebd5121de8d0fae7762423b6bf  
O<sub>3</sub>: 78e2e0038b691b8bedfc32116811da59  
O<sub>n</sub>: d7c4979a663ff2a4b0ec76829060c02c  
K<sub>3</sub>: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
fffe<sub>f</sub>dfcfb<sub>f</sub>af9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
CIPH<sub>K3</sub>(O<sub>n</sub>): e181c7e91bb0752e01cca4b957f7536a  
RMAC(R,M): e181c7e9

C.3.2 RMAC-AES256-II

RMAC-AES256, r=0, m=64, Mlen=128

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
fffe<sub>f</sub>dfcfb<sub>f</sub>af9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
R: none  
M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
800000000000000000000000000000000000  
O<sub>1</sub>: 5a6e045708fb7196f02e553d02c3a692  
O<sub>n</sub>: 6c6b8e74018490dd71ecc1c8702ec1b9  
K<sub>3</sub>: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
fffe<sub>f</sub>dfcfb<sub>f</sub>af9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
CIPH<sub>K3</sub>(O<sub>n</sub>): f0add4b561df479d39cc03e8cccbdf1b  
RMAC(R,M): f0add4b561df479d

RMAC-AES256, r=0, m=64, Mlen=384

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
fffe<sub>f</sub>dfcfb<sub>f</sub>af9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
R: none  
M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
800000000000000000000000000000000000

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$O_1$ : 5a6e045708fb7196f02e553d02c3a692  
 $O_2$ : c77147ebd5121de8d0fae7762423b6bf  
 $O_3$ : 78e2e0038b691b8bedfc32116811da59  
 $O_n$ : f97f3c703a595c4617629149ccc22404  
 $K_3$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
 $CIPH_{K_3}(O_n)$ : 285c32e810a3aa093f2ff2029cbb38e3  
 $RMAC(R, M)$ : 285c32e810a3aa09

$RMAC-AES256, r=0, m=64, Mlen=400$   
 $M$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
 202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
 3031  
 $K_1$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
 $K_2$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
 $R$ : none

$M || PAD$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
 202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
 303180000000000000000000000000000000  
 $O_1$ : 5a6e045708fb7196f02e553d02c3a692  
 $O_2$ : c77147ebd5121de8d0fae7762423b6bf  
 $O_3$ : 78e2e0038b691b8bedfc32116811da59  
 $O_n$ : d7c4979a663ff2a4b0ec76829060c02c  
 $K_3$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
 $CIPH_{K_3}(O_n)$ : e181c7e91bb0752e01cca4b957f7536a  
 $RMAC(R, M)$ : e181c7e91bb0752e

C.3.3 RMAC-AES256-III

$RMAC-AES256, r=16, m=80, Mlen=128$   
 $M$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 $K_1$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
 $K_2$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
 $R$ : 0002

$M || PAD$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 800000000000000000000000000000000000  
 $O_1$ : 5a6e045708fb7196f02e553d02c3a692  
 $O_n$ : 6c6b8e74018490dd71ecc1c8702ec1b9  
 $K_3$ : 0f0c0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
 fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
 $CIPH_{K_3}(O_n)$ : b7ded9aac054a94681dae59b719ef340  
 $RMAC(R, M)$ : b7ded9aac054a94681da

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RMAC-AES256, r=16, m=80, Mlen=384

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
fffefffdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
R: 0002  
M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
800000000000000000000000000000000000  
O<sub>1</sub>: 5a6e045708fb7196f02e553d02c3a692  
O<sub>2</sub>: c77147ebd5121de8d0fae7762423b6bf  
O<sub>3</sub>: 78e2e0038b691b8bedfc32116811da59  
O<sub>n</sub>: f97f3c703a595c4617629149ccc22404  
K<sub>3</sub>: 0f0c0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
fffefffdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
CIPH<sub>K3</sub>(O<sub>n</sub>): c70a7fed4cd277afd60d5913721c5bb3  
RMAC<sub>(R,M)</sub>: c70a7fed4cd277afd60d

RMAC-AES256, r=16, m=80, Mlen=400

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
3031  
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
fffefffdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
R: 0002  
M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
303180000000000000000000000000000000  
O<sub>1</sub>: 5a6e045708fb7196f02e553d02c3a692  
O<sub>2</sub>: c77147ebd5121de8d0fae7762423b6bf  
O<sub>3</sub>: 78e2e0038b691b8bedfc32116811da59  
O<sub>n</sub>: d7c4979a663ff2a4b0ec76829060c02c  
K<sub>3</sub>: 0f0c0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
fffefffdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
CIPH<sub>K3</sub>(O<sub>n</sub>): 4c12760f4f7b8e2436865bae1537e852  
RMAC<sub>(R,M)</sub>: 4c12760f4f7b8e243686

C.3.4 RMAC-AES256-IV

RMAC-AES256, r=64, m=96, Mlen=128

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f

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K2: 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
ffffedfdcfbfbaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
R: 00020406080a0c0e  
  
M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
80000000000000000000000000000000  
O\_1: 5a6e045708fb7196f02e553d02c3a692  
O\_n: 6c6b8e74018490dd71ecc1c8702ec1b9  
K3: 0f0c090a030005060706050403020100  
ffffedfdcfbfbaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
CIPH K3 (O\_n): 83db6b37047837f7ffba624c256288b6  
RMAC(R, M): 83db6b37047837f7ffba624c

RMAC-AES256, r=64, m=96, Mlen=384

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
ffffedfdcfbfbaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
R: 00020406080a0c0e  
  
M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
80000000000000000000000000000000  
O\_1: 5a6e045708fb7196f02e553d02c3a692  
O\_2: c77147ebd5121de8d0fae7762423b6bf  
O\_3: 78e2e0038b691b8bedfc32116811da59  
O\_n: f97f3c703a595c4617629149ccc22404  
K3: 0f0c090a030005060706050403020100  
ffffedfdcfbfbaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
CIPH K3 (O\_n): ac4be4c926fbed500499011597d3fba0  
RMAC(R, M): ac4be4c926fbed5004990115

RMAC-AES256, r=64, m=96, Mlen=400

M: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
3031  
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
ffffedfdcfbfbaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
R: 00020406080a0c0e  
  
M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
30318000000000000000000000000000  
O\_1: 5a6e045708fb7196f02e553d02c3a692  
O\_2: c77147ebd5121de8d0fae7762423b6bf

DRAFT

$O_3$ : 78e2e0038b691b8bedfc32116811da59  
 $O_n$ : d7c4979a663ff2a4b0ec76829060c02c  
 $K_3$ : 0f0c090a030005060706050403020100  
fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
 $CIPH_{K_3}(O_n)$ : b47959ad4f4974a9331c66e906b2e95c  
 $RMAC(R, M)$ : b47959ad4f4974a9331c66e9

C.3.5 RMAC-AES256-V

RMAC-AES256, r=128, m=128, Mlen=128

$M$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
 $K_1$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
 $K_2$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
 $R$ : 00020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e

$M || PAD$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
80000000000000000000000000000000  
 $O_1$ : 5a6e045708fb7196f02e553d02c3a692  
 $O_n$ : 6c6b8e74018490dd71ecc1c8702ec1b9  
 $K_3$ : 0f0c090a03000506171411121b181d1e  
fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
 $CIPH_{K_3}(O_n)$ : f04cc0e7396a8621b75809cf71433e77  
 $RMAC(R, M)$ : f04cc0e7396a8621b75809cf71433e77

RMAC-AES256, r=128, m=128, Mlen=384

$M$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
 $K_1$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
 $K_2$ : 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100  
fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
 $R$ : 00020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e

$M || PAD$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
80000000000000000000000000000000  
 $O_1$ : 5a6e045708fb7196f02e553d02c3a692  
 $O_2$ : c77147ebd5121de8d0fae7762423b6bf  
 $O_3$ : 78e2e0038b691b8bedfc32116811da59  
 $O_n$ : f97f3c703a595c4617629149ccc22404  
 $K_3$ : 0f0c090a03000506171411121b181d1e  
fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0  
 $CIPH_{K_3}(O_n)$ : 40c904de3a42afe1ff31ddbc745c0b29  
 $RMAC(R, M)$ : 40c904de3a42afe1ff31ddbc745c0b29

RMAC-AES256, r=128, m=128, Mlen=400

$M$ : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f



DRAFT

```
3031
K1: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
    101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
K2: 0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100
    fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0
R:  00020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e

M || PAD: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
           101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
           202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f
           303180000000000000000000000000000000
O_1: 5a6e045708fb7196f02e553d02c3a692
O_2: c77147ebd5121de8d0fae7762423b6bf
O_3: 78e2e0038b691b8bedfc32116811da59
O_n: d7c4979a663ff2a4b0ec76829060c02c
K3:  0f0c090a03000506171411121b181d1e
     fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0
CIPH_K3(O_n): e18aea70cb4f19a9f00761f26f9cb942
RMAC(R, M):  e18aea70cb4f19a9f00761f26f9cb942
```

**C.4 RMAC-TDES112 Example Vectors**

**C.5 RMAC-TDES168 Example Vectors**

[Triple DES example vectors will be provided later.]

## Appendix D: References

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